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ABSTRACT 
  
This article discusses the importance of ethical guidance and regulation on the change of world 
research climate supported by information and communication technology (ICT). The research 
has resulted in artificial intelligence and „super‟ human entities which are predicted to potentially 
cause damage and destruction of humans. In this context, human is placed as an information 
organism parallel to other information entity. Human is no longer a single entity as a center of 
reflection on a moral action. This research aimed to reflect on the ontology of Floridian 
information based on ontocentrism as the axiological footing of its information ethical theory. 
The method used was hermeneutics. The research findings showed that the reduction of human 
position creates human nervousness as a knowing subject. Therefore, ethical regulation is 
required on artificial agent construction effort as moral agent within the constellation of ethical 
actions in the information ecosystem.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, our awareness as human being is disturbed by a series of phenomenal events 
and tends to disrupt the work of our common sense. A „female‟ robot named Sophia designed by 
American scientist, David Hanson, for the first time officially become a citizen. The Government 
of Saudi Arabia Kingdom becomes the first country in the world to grant a citizenship on a robot. 
Obviously, this is surprising and triggers our reason to work and ask, whether the progress in the 
field of artificial intelligence has indeed been able to create robot that has a capacity which 
resembles human capacity so that a country needs to appoint it as a citizen? Do robots will have 
the same position of rights and obligations with our rights and obligations as human being when 
they are made as a citizen? Are our growing numbers which then bringing the thought to look for 
other planet as the next living place because of it is estimated that in the Earth that we live in for 
millions of years and no longer accommodate to our existence in the future, still needs to bring in 
millions of other robots?       
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The second incident is a straightforward statement by Russian President, Vladimir 
Putin, some time ago that reminds us that the super-human era is already in front of us. In his 
opinion, when this super human is used as a super soldier who has undergoes gene modification,  
it will create soldiers that fight without fear, compassion, regret or pain. Therefore, this type of 
soldier obviously will uncontrollable and destroy the human life.   
The third incident is when a major social media company, Facebook, through Facebook 
Artificial Intelligence Research was developing their artificial intelligence robot with the purpose 
to mimicking human negotiation process in selling, buying and barter process, eventually shut 
down the robots named Bob and Alice because it turned out that these two robots were able to 
communicate with them of language creation. 
Those phenomenon‟s above of course raises our awareness and concern for the future of 
human being which begin to be eroded by the presence of other entity, the results of scientific 
world advancement of NBIC (Nano technology, Biotechnology, Information technology and 
Cognitive science). The advancement in scientific fields deeply alters the meaning of human 
excellence. This means that the presence of the advancement of scientific world and ICT can be 
considered as a threat when we cannot control or understand the technology presented. We 
should represent again the fundamental questions about our existence as human beings that we 
have echoed for thousand years ago, such as: „who we are‟, „where are we going‟, „how do we 
relate to the world‟ and other questions that disturb our tranquility as human beings. Of course, 
these questions remind us of our true self as human being mandated by God as the ruler of the 
world. 
Seeing the signs above, it is understandable that we are cautious and try to think 
seriously about the potential damage and destruction of human beings. Perhaps this view is far-
fetched a tends to be exaggerated, but the same thing is also delivered by the CEO of Tesla and 
SpaceX, Elon Musk that we should be wary of the development of the artificial intelligence 
world which he analogized as an effort to „summon the devil‟ and should focus more on the 
development of AI (artificial intelligence) rather than North Korea‟s nuclear conflict. According 
to him, global competition in the development of artificial intelligence has the potential to cause 
Third World War. The same thing is also expressed by one of the greatest physicists of this 
century, Stephen Hawking, which once stated that artificial intelligence will bring disaster to 
mankind.   
Perhaps, this is what drives Italian information Philosopher, Luciano Floridi, to suggest 
a universal and impartial ethical concept based on the principle of ontological equality in which 
every information organism (inforg) must treat other information organisms equally and allow it 
to exist and evolve in a way that according to its nature. It means that Floridi seeks to provide 
ethical foundation for the occurrence of moral matters that may arise in the future. In this 
position, human has lost their privileged place in anthropocentric world, and slowly realizes and 
accepts that we are part of the information object. Being an information being means we are not 
too different from other information objects which we have one thing in common, that is living 
in informative environment, or what Floridi referred to as infosphere. An environment that is 
almost comparable to cyberspace, but this cyberspace is only one of the sub-regions, while the 
infospheres includes both offline and analog information space. In the ontological perspective, 
the infosphere is a concept that can be equated to Beings (reality). Infosphere is a global space of  
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information, which includes cyberspace as well as classic mass media such as libraries and 
archives. Thus, infosphere is the whole space that encompasses all available information, 
including nature that can be said to be part of infosphere. Therefore, recognizing that human  
beings with intelligence are in the same position as artificial intelligence artifacts the need to 
reinterpret the human position in the reality arises, that is human position in the infosphere.  
Thus, it is clear that the changes that occur in society that fully tied to information 
technology, encourages us to think of a new ontology unique of the information society, an 
ethical guide that can serve as theoretical framework in developing and establishing an ethical 
foundation leading to the creation of appropriate and adequate regulations. 
 
RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Humans who were originally the only respected agent who had the highest moral status in 
their lives in the universe, were rivaled by the emergence of other information organisms/inforg 
inhabiting the same environment. This fundamental change causes us as humans to lose a 
privileged place in the anthropocentric world, and slowly realizing and accepting that we are 
inforg. Being an inforg means we are not too different from other artificial intelligence artifacts, 
as Turing claims that machines are objects or artefacts that can think and have intelligence. In 
fact, these artificial intelligence artifacts have one thing in common with us, both living in an 
informative environment, or what Floridi calls as the infosphere. Infosphere is a global space of 
information, which includes cyberspace as well as classic mass media such as libraries and 
archives. Thus, the infosphere is the whole space that encompasses all available information, 
including nature that can be said to be part of the infosphere. Therefore, by recognizing that 
intelligent human beings are in the same position as artificial intelligence artifacts, the need 
arises to reinterpret the human position in reality, namely the human position in the infosphere. 
Therefore, it takes a new theoretical approach to overcome the moral problems caused by 
ICT. Since ICT according to Floridi builds new information habitat that is filled with all 
information entities, such as: information agent, characters, interactions, processes and its mutual 
relations; it is an abstract equivalent to the ecosystem, a theory that makes information ethics an 
e-nvironmental ethic, or synthetic ethic, or infosphere ethics, for inforg like us. 
Floridi then suggested his view which later became the foundation of the theory of 
information ethics he developed namely his understanding of the information object in the 
infosphere that has “intrinsic value” so that subject to moral respect. This thinking foundation 
seems to be embraced by Floridi from his understanding that the fundamentality of moral status 
is the informational state of an entity. As long as all entities, whether animate or not, can be 
considered to have informational state, it will be given a moral status, an intrinsic moral value. 
The inalienable moral values of the entity and therefore deserve to receive moral judgment and 
respect. These moral values may be minimal and trivial, therefore they can be considered as 
moral recipients, and directed to some degree of minimum moral respect. So, according to 
Floridi there seems to be not enough reason to not adopt a higher, more inclusive and more 
ontocentric perspective. Thus, every information object has the minimal right to survive and 
thrive by improving and enriching itself. 
In this article, the focus of research is directed on questioning the understanding of the  
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concept of intrinsic value of information objects that is directly related to Floridian information 
metaphysics concepts that serve as the ontological basis of their information ethics, a 
metaphysical concept which views the infosphere as ontologically Being. This view then raises 
the thesis that all entities that inhabit the infosphere are information objects that have intrinsic 
value. Therefore, each entity is worthy of moral respect and is therefore instructed not to be 
damaged, eliminated and abolished. Because then the action will cause and increase the entropy 
in the infosphere. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Floridi's effort in building his „throne‟ of information ethics theory began when he 
presented his ideas and thoughts as outlined in an article entitled “Information Ethics: On the 
Theoretical Foundations of Computer Ethics” at an international discussion in 1999. This article 
highlights the relationship between information and computer ethics. Floridi‟s shift from 
computer ethic to information ethic is based on his observation that the ethical question arises is 
not only discussing about the issues of to which extent the computer challenges the morality of 
our actions, but also the question of how far we are, not just computer professionals but the 
whole party of policy holders, challenged by what he called as infosphere. This shift then 
obscures our view, through ICT mediation, to the meaning of online life in which we have 
conceptualized it as a two-sided life, one side being analog, carbon-based, offline and the other is 
digital, silicon-based, online. Thus, the mix between evolutionary adaptation of human agents 
with the digital environment, and as a form of postmodern life becomes increasingly unclear. 
Floridi (2013, 8) then called it as an experience in online life (onlife). 
Therefore, it takes a new theoretical approach to overcome the moral problems that arise 
caused by ICT. Since ICT according to Floridi (2013, 86) builds a new information habitat filled 
with all information entities, such as: information agent, characters, interactions, processes and 
their mutual relations; is an abstract equivalent to the ecosystem. This section relies on the 
method described above to outline the interpretation of information ethics as an e-nvironmental 
ethic, or synthetic ethics, or infosphere ethics, to our inforg.  
The fundamental moral claim about information ethics is that all entities that inhabit the 
infosphere are the objects of information. Because of their status as an information object, all 
entities are entitled to intrinsic moral values, meaning that they have an inalienable moral value 
of themselves and therefore deserve moral judgment and respect. This moral value may be quite 
minimal, but it can be coupled with other moral considerations. This minimal moral value is then 
used as the basis for his argument that every information object must develop itself and no other 
entity should inhibit and eliminate any object. So, in accordance with the minimal rights attached 
to the agent, then agents should respect the information object as a destination on themselves. In 
this context, agents have a stewardship responsibility for the overall infosphere, to contribute to 
growth and maintain its sustainability by reducing entropy and not improving it. Floridi proposed 
a series of structured tasks to the infosphere, including tasks that should not cause, prevent and 
remove entropy from the infosphere and to promote the development of information entities and 
the overall infosphere. 
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RESEARCH  METHODS 
 
In order to reveal the basis of Floridi's conception of intrinsic value, the author performed 
the reading, meaning, and interpretation activity on the conception text. Therefore, writer used 
the hermeneutics method. A method used as an analysis in an effort to reveal the meaning 
contained in various discursive action. The goal is not to seek the objective meaning of a text but 
the meaning of a text interpreted by the interpreter in certain situations. How the interpreter 
understands the text in a social, political and cultural context. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
The Floridian information ethic, which based on an information ecosystem, is intended to 
go beyond an anthropocentric perspective and view all „being‟ as ethical. This ontological view 
is much criticized because it blatantly ignores the human subject which is the origin of the ethical 
theory. So far our understanding is shaped by the belief that ethical issues are exclusively human 
(anthropocentric). However, this certainly does not mean that we do not recognize the moral 
rights of animals, artificial agents, or even inanimate objects. The point is that the recognition is 
still human-centered and as the only entity with intrinsic ethical values. 
Floridi (2001) developed the concept of information ecology as an appropriate type of 
information ethics to handle the world of data, information, knowledge, and communication as a 
„new environment‟ which he called the infosphere. However, it seems that Floridi does not limit 
prima facie concepts about the infosphere and its information ethics. We can conclude that the 
infosphere is understood differently ontologically from the physical world. This means that in 
Florid's viewpoint, this infosphere is a metaphysical concept. Infosphere is understood as an 
environment formed by the totality of information entity processes, including all agents, traits 
and mutual relationships among them (Floridi, 1999: 44). The infosphere is considered as an 
alternative, non-natural environment or can be called as the atopic space of mental life. This 
assumption clearly shows that the infosphere is understood to be metaphysical or idealistic. This 
view is shared by Floridi who said that the infosphere is not a virtual environment filled with the 
„material‟ nature of the world. Even Floridi (2013, 10) predicted that someday the physical world 
we inhabit becomes one part of the infosphere. 
According to Floridi, we are not allowed to reduce the amount of information in the 
world because it is not ethical and can harm the information itself as something that has intrinsic 
value. Thus, the fundamental thought is we should not reduce or eliminate something that has 
intrinsic value. This assumption can be seen that Floridi seeks to return to an ancient tradition 
that adapts nature and environment to value and thus they deserve respect. Floridi (1999, 47) 
then reinforces this argument by proclaiming the abstract “basic principal/norm” or prima 
principia moralia: 
 
1. Entropy should not occur in the infosphere (zero law) 
2. Entropi should be prevented in the infosphere 
3. Entropi should be removed in the infosphere 
4. Information welfare should be supported by expanding (information quantity),  
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improving (information quality) and enriching (information diversity) of infosphere. 
The idea of ethical norms is intended as an anticipation of any event of destruction, which 
is not only happening to living beings and its good life skills, but includes all entities. Since all 
beings are part of the global environment and according to Floridi they are formed through 
information, meaning that their existence consists of any amount of information whatever their 
entity is so that they are ordered not to cause harm or danger that can reduce the amount of 
information available in the world. “Let all things flourish” is the motto of Floridi's ethics.  
One of Floridi‟s ideas that caused controversy related to information ethics theory he 
developed was his understanding on information object in the infosphere that have “intrinsic 
value” so that it is subject to moral respect. This thinking foundation seems to be embraced by 
Floridi from his understanding that moral status fundamentality is the informational stated of an 
entity. In addition, in an effort to strengthen his thinking foundation, Floridi (2002, 290) 
developed two theses which became the main support of his Information Ethics theory, namely: 
the first thesis stated that qua information object can become a moral agent; the second thesis 
stated that qua information object can have intrinsic moral value, although minimum, so that 
they can become the recipient of moral, subject to some minimum moral respect. As long as all 
entities, whether animate or not, can be deemed to have an information status, it will be given a 
moral status, an intrinsic moral value. The inalienable moral values of the entity and therefore 
deserve moral judgment and respect. These moral values may be minimal and trivial, so they 
can be considered as moral recipients, and directed to some degree of minimum moral respect. 
Thus, according to Floridi there seems to be not enough reason not to adopt a higher, more 
inclusive and more ontocentric perspective. Thus, every information object has the minimal 
right to survive and thrive by improving and enriching itself. 
In addition, it seems that Floridi's view of this intrinsic value has been heavily influenced 
by ecological and environmental ethical views especially biocentric thought that considers life 
has intrinsic value, so the advice is taking life is unethical because it endangers life itself. In the 
same way, Floridi argues that reducing the amount of information in the world is unethical 
because it endangers the information itself as something that has intrinsic value. It means that an 
action which harms the infosphere, namely causes the infosphere to be reduced or poor, is a 
negative action. Because the quantity and quality of information must be enhanced, among 
others, by enriching the infosphere, any action that impoverishes it is unenforceable action. 
Therefore, actions that may be good or bad is morally irrespective of the consequences, motives, 
universality, or virtues, but because they affect the infosphere in a positive or negative way. So, 
the basic premise is “we must not reduce or eliminate something that has intrinsic value”. Here, 
seen the return of Floridi to the ancient tradition that adapts nature and environment to value and 
thus they deserve respect and undisturbed status. The opposite ethical attitude is shown in 
utilitarian ethics, which view that everything can develop, provided it is useful for improving 
some of the more important purpose. Thus, it can be concluded that Floridi's attempt that seems 
to force himself to take ontocentrisme as its ontological basis is driven more by environmental 
ethical motivation. The same thing is corroborated by Callicott (1995), an environmental 
philosopher, that if we should begin to assess things that intrinsically valuable that we ourselves 
do not have such values, we need good reasons to do so. Thus, the agency's moral behavior must 
be guided by the fact that his actions create a negative or positive impact on the environment. As  
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we have seen, not only life forms deserve respect and bring moral interests, but also things in 
the environment. 
In addition, we can also see the “harmonization” of Floridi's thinking with Kant, which 
he criticized a lot. We can see implicitly that Floridi's argument above that the information object 
or what he called as the infosphere should be given an intrinsic ethical value, looks like the 
Kantian argument. Kant said that humans should be treated as goals and never as vehicles. 
Therefore, humans must be placed at the highest ethical value, any action that endangers humans 
and causes them to lose their dignity as human beings is not ethical because as autonomous and 
rational beings, human beings deserve respect and moral values. By the same token, Floridi 
broadened this picture so that what deserves respect and has moral value is not only animate 
entity, but everything that exists, namely the infosphere itself. Thus, in this context, Floridi 
seems to have the same idea with Kant that moral value is the intrinsic nature of the entity. 
A question that disturbs our awareness in axiological perspective as one of the impacts of 
today's ICT development is can morality be delegated to an artificial agent or should it remain 
particular to human domain? This question is put forward as part of the reaction of Floridian idea 
of an artificial agent that can be qualified as a moral agent. According to Floridi (2013: 110), not 
all artificial agents are moral agents, but some are moral agents. Floridi's argument against the 
concept of artificial agent morality is based on the responsibility concept, namely responsibility 
and accountability. A designer, for example, has a responsibility for designing an artificial agent 
he or she creates, but may not have accountability for the agency's operations. The question then 
is whethet it is able to create an artificial agent that is morally responsible for their behavior? 
This condition is influenced by the development of ICT and genetic biology that leads to 
methodological reductionism and praxis because of the anthropomorphic concept used to see 
humans that are similar to other species. Moreover, when the genetic code has been discovered 
with the help of ICTs, it provides the thinking foundation for a naturalistic and technocratic view 
of man from the position of personal relationships (personhood) and their capacity for free and 
responsible action. 
One important feature of Floridian's information ethics is its attempt to analyze what is 
included as a moral agent. According to him, moral agents don‟t always have to be human. This 
shift of the moral agent center from human marks a major distinction between information ethics 
and major ethical theories, especially Kantian ethics that are strongly focused on the rationality 
of human actors. Actually, if we look more deeply, the information ethics do not fully show the 
separation with the concentration in humans. However, it is indeed seen the human erosion as the 
center of moral action. This process of erosion actually begins when biocentric ethics emphasizes 
the value of life and misery in which the moral recipient in this ethic is not necessarily human. 
The ethics of the land even further develops the concept of the moral recipient to the 
environment, so that non living things, and how we treat them, should be considered in our moral 
framework. We should also note the variations in human culture to consider which objects are 
animate (thus requiring special moral treatment) and those that are not. 
Floridian information ethic extends the classification of its information entity by 
involving the inanimate entity in its moral considerations. This is possible if the treatment of all 
objects, whether animate or inanimate is performed by infocentric. Inanimate objects show more 
than machines that become the focus of philosophical debates on artificial intelligence. Thus, the  
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argument is not focused on classical artificial intelligence problems involving intelligence, 
intentionality, and even morality in artificially produced machinery, although back to the 
argument, especially in terms of intentionality. The argument delivered is that we must judge 
objects as moral recipients, and in certain circumstances, as moral agents at a minimum level. 
This is because the inanimate object is an information object, like humans and animals, and it is 
appropriate to sit side by side with animate objects in a moral framework. 
The classical philosophical view sees that a non-human entity can not be the subject of 
responsibility. However, can we give little space to consider new technical artifacts, especially 
computers and their derivatives, which have displayed properties that make us doubt the existing 
views, even though this is certainly ethically inconvenient? (Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 2003: 
27). The argument is that because they are adaptable, able to learn, autonomous, and perhaps 
even intelligent. Because of that nature, computers can be described as artificial agents and may 
also be artificial moral agents. 
The rejection of this exotic idea by Floridi came insistently like floods that could roll his 
thought. At least, Rafael Capurro commented quite spicy. In his opinion, why should we create 
artificial agents that we impose to share moral responsibility of moral events. Capurro considers 
that we have about 6 billion moral agents on earth. Why should we create millions or even 
billions of artificial agents? He reminded again the Ockham knife's analogy, entia non sunt 
multiplicanda sine necessitate. Thus, he argues, to think of the possibility of artificial moral 
agents is not a realistic or rational alternative, at least in terms of what to do and think about first. 
Capurro (2008, 167-73) noticed that most of the issues raised today realated to the 
epistemological and moral status of digital agents is simply the repetition of arguments occurred 
in the 1970s with regard to artificial intelligence. The assertion that any agent who generates 
good or evil will be morally responsible for his actions is simply to dilute the concept of 
morality. 
In discussing artificial agents using the lens of abstraction level, we can at least describe 
them in two ways: first, artificial agents whose behavior is fully defined by the designer, and 
agents capable of learning and adapting and altering their own programs autonomously. Floridi 
defined moral agents as all interactive, autonomous, and adaptable transition systems capable of 
performing morally qualified actions (Floridi, 2004). Floridi further explained what is meant by 
an interactive transitional system is if the system and its environment (can) act with each other. It 
means there is a mutual attachment of one action by the agent and the recipient. Meanwhile, the 
autonomous transition system is seen as a system capable of changing the state without direct 
response to the interaction, which can perform an internal transition to change its state. Finally, 
the transition system can adapt if the system interaction can change the transition rules which in 
turn can change the state. 
This Floridi's conception is clearly controversial. How can an artificial agent bear 
responsibility for its actions even though it is a system that autonomous, interactive and 
adaptable to change? Of course, we see that a system that become artificial agent, its moral 
responsibilities are still charged to the designer and other stakeholders, no matter how 
autonomous the system is. In this context, Grodzinsky, Miller, and Wolf once asked whether an 
artificial agent capable of altering its own programming system so that it can be said to be so 
autonomous that it can dispose of the original designer's responsibility for his creation? Of  
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course, although artificial agents can be said to be very autonomous and perhaps this autonomy 
can be equated with human free will, it can not become more autonomous than humans. Thus, 
the idea of moral accountability into an artificial agent does not mean leaving the agent outside 
the control of techno-sociology. 
Now we try to describe the conception of artificial agents as moral agents as supported by 
Floridi through three characters, namely: interactive, autonomous and adaptability. Floridi 
interpreted interactivity as an agent and the environment act with each other. This description 
seems too simple and needs to be elaborated more deeply. To reinforce this view, Floridi refered 
to an example of “the force of gravity between the body”, in which there is simultaneous 
interaction. This Floridian analogy hardly seems not in harmony with the shift from agency to 
moral agency. Our common sense would surely reject the analogy of gravity as an analogue 
associated with moral issues. 
The second character is autonomous, defined as an agent capable of changing 
circumstances without direct response to interaction, can make an internal transition to change 
circumstances. The statement of “without direct response to interaction,” means that this system 
not only responds to input or creates output, but has several mechanisms to determine when to 
change from one state to another, meaning free of input and output. Obviously the statement 
contains a problem, so far we know that a computer system change its situation caused by the 
stimulus. Nothing changes the situation for no apparent reason. The stimulus can be external or 
internal. 
The last character is adaptable, which is interpreted as an agent interaction that can 
change the transition rules that lead to changing conditions. Thus, the moral artificial agent has 
the capacity to make changes to the system. Lucas (2008, 54) describes this problem as internal 
conditions represent transitional changes which rules can be seen in two ways, whether this rules 
of transitions-change are at the same conceptual level as all other transitional rules, or they are at 
a higher conceptual level. If they are not on the same conceptual level as the transition with 
normal rule, then they set the rules to change the rules. If they are at the same time the 
conceptual level as a normal transition rule, then they only set the conditions for the existing 
changes. If the ways in which the system can change the transition rules should be treated as 
special cases, then the definition of the regression problem should be considered. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The urgency to create an ethical foundation to address the problems arising as a result of 
the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution and its accompanying fields 
(nanotechnology, biotechnology and cognitive science), seems to have found its momentum. 
Various events and incidents present before us recently, have disturbed our awareness and 
rationality about what is truly present in our midst. The phenomenon of Sophia's robot, super 
soldier, Tesla‟s „smart‟ car and various latest developments in the field of artificial intelligence 
and biotechnology seem to arise our subconsciousness that the world we live in is moving 
toward life that forces us to rethink our existence as the only wonderful and noble being 
commanded by God to be the world's leader. 
Thus, the Floridian theory of information ethics is necessary especially in anticipating  
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and  overcoming the radical changes that touch our space of morality as one of the inhabitants of 
the information environment (infosphere). However, the existence of this theory as a conceptual 
foundation for the development of ethical and legal regulation still requires stronger arguments 
and justifications so that the argument of this theory is not easy to break. There is still a need for 
the contributions of other experts to make the information ethics as a universally and impartially 
applicable macro theory. 
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